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Abstract
This paper formalizes the idea that more hedging instruments may destabilize markets when
traders have heterogeneous expectations and adapt their behavior according to experience
based reinforcement learning. In a simple asset pricing model with heterogeneous beliefs the
introduction of additional Arrow securities may destabilize markets, and thus increase price
volatility, and at the same time decrease average welfare. We also investigate whether a fully
rational agent can employ additional hedging instruments to stabilize markets. It turns out
that the answer depends on the composition of the population of non-rational traders and the
information gathering costs for rationality.
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1“Our fundamental risks will thus be insured against, hedged, diversiﬁed, making for a safer world. By
lightening the burden of risk, a new democratic ﬁnance will encourage all of us to be more venturesome,
more inspired in our activities.”, Robert J. Shiller, The New Financial Order: Risk in the 21st Century,
Princeton University Press, 2003.
1 Introduction
Robert J. Shiller advocates an expansion of the number of appropriately designed risk
hedging instruments. Many writers, e.g., Rajan (2005), have recently raised concerns
about the impact on market stability due to the explosive growth of innovations like
”ﬁnancial engineering” that has essentially amounted to a rapid growth in the number
of risk hedging instruments. We agree with a commonly held view that increases
in appropriately designed risk hedging instruments can increase welfare; but we are
also concerned about the impact of addition of extra risk hedging instruments on the
process of achieving (or not achieving) equilibrium.
This paper formalizes the idea that more hedging instruments or derivative securities
may destabilize a market when traders are heterogeneous and learn from experience
based on realized returns. Here is a sketch of the idea. Consider a heterogeneous agent
intertemporal asset market where risk averse agents are learning the structure of asset
prices in the economy by using, for example, different prediction strategies of future
asset prices under some kind of reinforcement or evolutionary learning, for instance as
in Brock and Hommes (1997). Let there be S states of the world and a ﬁnite number
n of contingent claims or risk hedging instruments available. If n < S − 1 the market
is incomplete. We model the risk hedging instruments as “Arrow” securities for state
s, 1 ≤ s ≤ n < S − 1, each paying 1 if state s occurs and 0 otherwise. Elementary
Arrow securities are used here as a convenient analytical device, and a suitable combi-
nation of Arrow securities may serve as a proxy of more realistic ﬁnancial instruments
such as futures, derivatives or recently introduced collateralized debt obligations. Now
2suppose that n < S − 2 and that a new risk hedging instrument, that is, a new Arrow
security, is added for state n + 1 < S − 1. Then, since agents are risk averse, and
since they can use the new Arrow security to hedge out “extra” risk, they will now
tend to place bigger positions on the market. Thus if an agent’s forecasting tool turns
out to be on the “right side” of the market, it will return a larger proﬁt (because a larger
position has been placed on the market), and therefore it will receive a stronger rein-
forcement and more individuals will switch to using that particular forecasting tool.
This, in turn, implies that the learning system is now more likely to “overshoot”, i.e.
to become unstable, and consequently market volatility increases. This intuitive idea
will be formalized in a stylized model.
On the other hand it has been argued that an increasing multitude of derivative secu-
rities has made it possible for rational speculators to help stabilize markets since they
can take bets on market imperfections and hedge their risk. A second contribution of
our paper is to investigate the potential stabilizing role of rational traders in a mar-
ket with co-existing non fully rational traders. Can a perfectly rational trader employ
a growing number of hedging instruments to stabilize the market? It turns out that,
when the information gathering costs for full rational expectations are large, ratio-
nal traders can not prevent destabilization. However, we will also present conditions
(depending on the composition of the co-existing population of non-rational traders)
under which, as the number of hedging instruments increases, the beneﬁts of “thinking
hard” outweigh its costs, and as the market approaches completeness, rational agents
may outperform non-rational traders, stabilize the market and limit welfare losses.
To formalize these ideas in the simplest setting we use the asset pricing model with
heterogeneous beliefs of Brock and Hommes (1998), but the analysis can be gener-
alized, for instance to a general equilibrium overlapping generations framework. We
show that adding more Arrow securities may destabilize market dynamics and thus in-
crease market volatility. In particular, we show that the primary bifurcation parameter,
marking the onset of instability, occurs “earlier” when there are more Arrow securities.
3Comparing our approach to the existing literature, it is probably fair to say that most
research in ﬁnance leans towards the standard ﬁnancial economics view that adding
derivatives or futures markets increases welfare, reduces volatility and improves infor-
mation revelation. The “General Equilibrium with Incomplete markets” (GEI) liter-
ature nevertheless contains a number of theoretical papers showing that introduction
of new securities may decrease equilibrium welfare (e.g. Hart 1975, Elul 1995, Cass
and Citanna 1998), or may increase price volatility (e.g. Citanna and Schmedders,
2005, Bhamra and Uppal, 2006; see the comprehensive survey by Mayhew (2000)1).
An important difference with our approach is that these papers investigate ﬁnite pe-
riod, static GEI equilibrium models under rational expectations, while we attempt to
model how learning dynamics and heterogeneous expectations affects the attainment
of equilibrium; see Farmer and Geanakoplos (2008) for a recent discussion. An im-
portant contribution of our paper is that reinforcement learning dynamics of non-fully
rational agents is a potentially amplifying force to price instability when the number
of hedging instruments increases.
There is empirical evidence that experience based reinforcement learning, a key fea-
ture in our modeling framework, also plays an important role in investment decisions
in real markets. For example, Ippolito (1992), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Sirri and
Tufano (1998), Rockinger (1996) and Karceski (2002) show for mutual funds data that
money ﬂows into past good performers, while ﬂowing out of past poor performers,
and that performance persists on a short term basis. Pension funds are less extreme in
picking good performance but are tougher on bad performers (Del Guerico and Tkac,
2002). Recently, Benartzi and Thaler (2007) have shown that heuristics and biases
1Mayhew (2000) also surveys empirical work on how futures and derivatives affect price volatility of the under-
lying. The empirical results on the introduction of futures are ambiguous, some authors ﬁnding a decrease, while
others ﬁnding an increase in volatility. Gerlach et al. (2006) investigate the behavior of volatility of returns in bond
and stock markets for a sample of eight countries using 150 years of data. Unsurprisingly, volatility has been high
during episodes of economic and political turbulence. Interestingly, volatility has been high since the seventies, a time
featuring an explosive growth of ﬁnancial futures.
4play a signiﬁcant role in retirement savings decisions. For example, using data from
Vanguard they show that the equity allocation of new participants rose from 58% in
1992 to 74% in 2000, following a strong rise in stock prices in the late 1990s, but
dropped, back to 54% in 2002, following the strong fall in stock prices.
The asset pricing model with heterogeneous belief that we employ as our stylized
framework is closely related to work in behavioral ﬁnance, evolutionary ﬁnance and
adaptive learning. The reader is referred to a number of recent surveys: Barberis
and Thaler (2003) give an extensive overview of behavioral ﬁnance (e.g. including
the work on noise trader models as in DeLong et al., 1990). More general surveys
on learning and bounded rationality and their role in enforcing convergence to ratio-
nal expectations or creating excess volatility include Evans and Honkapohja (2001),
Grandmont (1998) and Sargent (1993). Hens and Schenk-Hopp´ e (2008) provide stim-
ulating and comprehensive survey chapters in evolutionary ﬁnance.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 extends the asset pricing model with
heterogeneous beliefs to include Arrow securities. The main result here is that, when
there are more Arrow securities, the primary bifurcation towards instability occurs ear-
lier. Section 3 investigates the potential stabilizing role of rational traders. Conditions
(depending on the composition of non-rational traders) under which rational agents
can employ the Arrow securities to stabilize the market are given. Section 4 provides
an example where ﬁnancial innovation leads to an increase of market volatility as well
as a decrease in welfare. The example also shows that rational traders can not always
stabilize prices, when the market approaches completeness. Section 5 concludes. The
paper closes with a summary, conclusions, a brief discussion of hedging strategies in
real markets and suggestions for future research. An Appendix provides proofs of the
results.
52 An asset pricing model
In this section we extend the asset pricing model with heterogeneous beliefs of Brock
and Hommes (1997, 1998) by adding contingent claims or Arrow securities and in-
vestigate how these hedging instruments affect market stability. For any time period t,
there are S possible states s of the world in period t+1, occurring with probabilities αs
that are independent of time and common knowledge. Agents can buy risk free bonds
and two types of risky assets, stocks and Arrow securities. Bonds are bought at a ﬁxed
price 1 and pay R > 1 in the next period. Stocks are bought at a market price p0
t in







that is the new market price p0
t+1 plus a dividend ys depending on s. Finally Arrow se-
curities for state i are bought at pi
t and pay δs
i in state s, which is 1 if s = i and 0 other-
wise. Markets are incomplete: Arrow securities are only available for states 1,··· ,n,
where n < S − 1.
Let z0
t and zi
t denote the demand of an agent for respectively the stock and the i’th
Arrow security. Introduce vector notation by setting ˜ zt = (z1
t,··· ,zn
t ) and zt =
(z0
t, ˜ zt); ˜ pt = (p1
t,··· ,pn
t ) and pt = (p0
t, ˜ pt); δ = (δ1,··· ,δn) and α = (α1,··· ,αn).
Introduce moreover σ2 = Var qt+1; ηi = Cov(qt+1,δi) and η = (η1,··· ,ηn), and
Σ = Cov(δ). Finally, let a > 0 be the coefﬁcient of risk aversion and let Vn denote
the symmetric (n + 1) × (n + 1) variance-covariance matrix






Note that Vn is the variance-covariance matrix of the uncertain payments of the stock
and the n Arrow securities multiplied by the coefﬁcient of risk aversion a. The matrix
is singular if and only if a riskless portfolio can be constructed out of stock and Arrow
securities; this would for instance be possible if there were n = S−1 Arrow securities
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2αs, ηi = αi(y





αi(1 − αi) if i = j,
−αiαj if i 6= j.
The inner product of two vectors v and w is denoted by hv,wi. If Wt is the current


















The excess proﬁt in state s from trading the risky assets equals πs
t+1 = W s
t+1 − RWt.
Utility is assumed to be of mean–variance type:






















−R˜ pt + Etδ

. (3)
2.1 Rational benchmark The case of all traders having rational expectations is
the fundamental benchmark of the system. Arrow securities are endogenous to the
system and therefore their total supply is zero. The total supply of the stock is ζ0.
Denote expected dividends by ¯ y =
P
ysαs. If all markets clear, then we obtain under





t+1 + ¯ y = aσ
2ζ
0,
−R˜ pt + α = aηζ
0.
Imposing the transversality condition that prices remain bounded, these equations are
solved by constant fundamental prices pt = p∗ = (p0




¯ y − aσ2ζ0
R − 1







7The terms involving ζ0 can be interpreted as the risk premium required by the investors
to hold the risky assets.
2.2 Heterogeneous expectations. Consider now the case that agents are hetero-
geneous in their expectations or beliefs about next period’s price of the stock, but
homogeneous with respect to everything else.2












Here Bht is the belief vector of type h about the excess return of stock and Arrow
securities; this belief vector determines the investment strategy through (5). We will
refer to type h as a belief type or a prediction strategy. Since probabilities of states of
the world are assumed to be common knowledge, the expectation Etδ is the same for
all types. Note that agents differ in their assessment of Ehtqt+1, but agree on Vn. This
simplifying assumption is made for analytical tractability of the heterogeneous agent
case, but it is supported by the observation that there may be more agreement about
the variance than about the mean3.
It will be convenient to work with price deviations xt = pt −p∗ from the fundamental
2Heterogeneous expectations play an increasingly important role in economics and ﬁnance. LeBaron (2006) and
Hommes (2006) are up to date reviews, with each more than 100 references. Heterogeneity in forecasting future asset
prices is supported by evidence from survey data, as discussed e.g. in Vissing-Jorgensen (2003) and Shiller (2000).
Branch (2004) estimates a model with heterogeneous beliefs and time varying fractions, using survey data on inﬂation
expectations, while Boswijk et al. (2007) estimate a simple two type asset pricing model with heterogeneous beliefs,
fundamentalists versus trend extrapolators, on yearly S&P 500 data, 1871-2003.
3The observation that estimation of the variance or covariance from observed ﬁnancial returns series will be much
more accurate than estimation of the mean dates back to Merton (1980, especially Appendix A). The ARCH/GARCH
literature has shown that, under regularity conditions, conditional variance is easier to estimate than conditional mean,
see e.g. Bollerslev, Engle, and Nelson (1994, especially section 4).












The “technical trading rule” fh models how type h believes that the future price p0
t+1
will deviate from the fundamental, given past prices.
2.2.1 Market clearing. Let the market share (or fraction) of type h agents in pe-
riod t be denoted by nht. As before, Arrow securities are endogenous to the system,









nht˜ zht = 0. (6)





















nhtfht, ˜ xt = 0. (8)
We make a couple of observations. First, according to (8), the price deviations of
the Arrow securities are zero, implying that the Arrow securities are correctly priced.
Secondly, if fht happens to be equal for all types h, beliefs are homogeneous, and
there is no demand for Arrow securities. Only when beliefs are truly heterogeneous
the demand for Arrow securities will be non-zero, as different types hedge their risk
differently. Finally, under heterogeneous beliefs the market price of the stock will
in general deviate from its fundamental benchmark. In fact, the expression Rx0
t =
P
h nhtfht in (8) is the same as in the asset pricing model without Arrow securities in
Brock and Hommes (1998). However, as we will see below, the existence of Arrow
securitieswillaffectthemagnitudeofthefractionsnht throughreinforcementlearning.
92.2.2 Fitness. In order to close the model, the evolution of the market shares nht
has to be speciﬁed. We assume that these shares are determined by the ﬁtness uht−1 of
type h; the subscript t − 1 indicates that ﬁtness depends only on past observed prices.
The fraction of agents using strategy type h will thus be driven by “experience” or
“regret” through reinforcement learning. Given ﬁtnesses uht−1, the fraction of agents









These fractions can be derived from a random utility model (Manski and McFadden
(1981)). Note that as the ﬁtness uht−1 increases relative to the other type’s ﬁtnesses,
more agents will select trading strategy h. The intensity of choice parameter β > 0
in (9) measures how sensitive agents are to selecting the optimal prediction strategy.
This parameter is inversely related to the variance of the noise in the observation of
random utility. If β = 0, agents are insensitive to past performance and pick a strategy
at random: all fractions will then be equal to 1/H. In the other extreme case β → ∞,
all agents choose the forecast which performed best in the last period. An increase in
the intensity of choice β can therefore be seen as to represent an increase in the degree
of rationality with respect to evolutionary selection of strategies.
Asﬁtnessmeasureweuseaveragerisk-adjustedproﬁt, thatis, averageproﬁtscorrected
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Notice that this measure is consistent with the utility (2) of the agents5. Using (5), the
4The results discussed below do not depend on the details of the speciﬁcation of the updating rule (9). The
exponential function may for instance be replaced by another increasing function. What is key in (9) is that, as the
intensity of choice β moves from one extreme 0 to the other extreme +∞, the distribution of types moves from
uniform to a delta function with its peak at the best strategy.
5Another ﬁtness measure that may be of interest is (non-risk adjusted) realized proﬁts. The results for this alterna-
tive ﬁtness measure are very similar to those presented below.





t + ¯ y
−R˜ pt−1 + α

, (10)
and recalling that zht = V −1
n Bht, we rewrite risk–adjusted realized proﬁts as
uht = hBt−1,V −1
n Bh,t−1i − 1
2hBh,t−1,V −1
n Bh,t−1i.
In the special case where type h has rational expectations or perfect foresight, i.e.
Bh,t−1 = Bt−1, this expression simpliﬁes to uR
t = 1
2hBt−1,V −1
n Bt−1i. Now look at


































here e0 = (1,0,··· ,0). Since uR
t is independent of h and the fractions in the multi-
nomial logit model are independent of the ﬁtness level we conclude that risk–adjusted
proﬁts are equivalent, up to a constant factor, to (minus) squared prediction errors. In
the case when there are no Arrow securities we have (V −1
n )00 = 1/(aσ2).
2.3 Adding Arrow securities. We can now address our main question: what hap-
pens to the price dynamics when Arrow securities are added?
2.3.1 General mechanism The previous subsection has shown that, when we add
an extra Arrow security to the system, the dynamical behavior only changes through
the term (V −1
n )00 in the ﬁtness measure (11). Moreover, using (7) and (8) we get
zht = ζ





Let r = Cov(δn+1,(q0
t,δ1,··· ,δn)). We call the n + 1-th Arrow security relevant to
the portfolio zht if hr,V −1
n e0i 6= 0. Note that for Lebesgue almost all conﬁgurations
of the y0
s and αs, all Arrow securities are relevant. The following lemma is key.






Appendix A.1 contains the proof of the lemma. Instead of working with (V −1
n )00 it







, 0 ≤ n < S − 1. (13)
The quantity σ2
n may be viewed as a measure of risk when there are n Arrow securities.









S−1 = 0, (14)
implying that the risk measure decreases when more Arrow securities are added to the
market, as more risk can be hedged.
We are now ready to formulate our main result. A typical feature in reinforcement
or evolutionary learning systems as in Brock and Hommes (1997,1998) is that the
fundamental equilibrium may destabilize when the intensity of choice β to switch
strategies increases. We claim that adding Arrow securities leads to earlier primary
bifurcations:6
THEOREM 2.1. Consider the asset price dynamics with reinforcement learning in
(8–9) and ﬁtness measure given by average risk-adjusted proﬁts in (11). If β∗
0 is the
critical parameter value for which the steady state becomes unstable if there are no
Arrow securities, then for almost all dividends ys and probabilities αs the primary
bifurcation value β∗
n for the system with n Arrow securities and incomplete markets







0, 1 ≤ n < S − 2. (15)
This theorem implies that in the presence of more Arrow securities, the fundamental
equilibrium destabilizes earlier. There is a simple economic intuition behind the the-
orem. When there are more Arrow securities, agents will use them to hedge out more
6The same type of results hold more generally for n assets that are linear combinations of Arrow securities.
12risk and take bigger positions in the risky assets. The more Arrow securities there are,
the higher will be the rewards for trading strategies that turn out to be on the right side
of the market and, under reinforcement learning, successful strategies will attract even


























k=1 αk)(yj − ¯ y) +
Pn





where C = α1 ···αn/detVn > 0 does not depend on j.
WhenthenumberofArrowsecuritiesincreases, theriskmeasureσ2
n decreases. Hence,
it is clear from (16) that the introduction of additional Arrow securities forces opti-
mistic (pessimistic) agents, with the same risk aversion coefﬁcient a, to hold bigger
long (short) positions in the stock. For example, optimistic traders who predict next
period’s asset price deviation fht from the fundamental price to grow faster than R
times the current positive deviation, that is, for whom fht − Rx0
t > 0, will take larger
positions when there are more Arrow securities. Moreover, from (17) (note the minus
sign) we see that these optimistic traders take short positions in Arrows correspond-
ing to above average dividends and long position in Arrows corresponding to below
average dividends. Traders thus use the Arrow securities to hedge their risk and invest
more in the stock if they expect its price to rise. This is a leverage effect. More-
over, strategies that forecasted the price movement better will attract more followers
according to the risk-adjusted ﬁtness measure (11) and inequality (12). Stated differ-
ently, using hedging portfolios strategies that turned out to be “right” will be rewarded
more and attract more followers, while strategies that turned out be be “wrong” will
lose more.
A major implication of theorem 2.1 is that, if all other parameters including the in-
tensity of choice are ﬁxed, adding Arrow securities may destabilize the market. For
13when there are n Arrow securities, the ﬁtness given by average risk-adjusted proﬁts
in (11), is proportional to (V −1
n )00 or, equivalently, inversely proportional to the risk
measure σ2
n in (13). In the presence of n Arrow securities, the effective intensity of
choice of strategy selection in (9) is thus given by β0/σ2
n, where β0 is the intensity of
choice without Arrow securities. Figure 1(c) plots the effective intensity of choice as
the number of Arrow securities increases for a given dividend and probability struc-
ture. The effective intensity of choice increases past a critical value as the market
approaches completeness, thus creating instability under reinforcement learning.
3 The role of rational agents
In this section, we investigate the consequences of adding a fully rational agent to the
ecology of traders, that is, a trader that forecasts future prices perfectly.
3.1 Dynamics with rational agents. To add a perfect foresight rule to the market,
we have to be precise about the timing. At time period t−1, the rational type has made
a prediction x0
t about the price deviation of the risky asset that has to hold in period t.
At the beginning of period t, we assume that all other trader types submit their demand
functions ﬁrst. The rational type, indexed by h = 0, then chooses its demand exactly
such that the corresponding equilibrium price of the risky asset coincides with his
prediction x0
t. But this demand ﬁxes, through equation (7) with f0t = x0
t+1, a rational
prediction for next period’s price x0
t+1, after which the process repeats. Notice that the
rationaltypeisfreetochoosehisﬁrstpriceprediction, orequivalentlyhisﬁrstdemand,
as at that moment he is not bound by a previous prediction. The ﬁrst prediction will
be chosen as to avoid a rational bubble solution.
The rational trader is characterized by its forecast rule f0t and its ﬁtness u0t given by
f0t = x
0









14where C represents the cost of obtaining the perfect forecast. Adding a rational trader









We rewrite this equation, using nht = eβuht−1/Zt and Zt =
P




















Note that in the limit C → ∞, the fraction of perfectly foresighted agents tends to 0
and we recover the case without fully rational agents.
It is now convenient to introduce the parameter ε = e−βC; then ε → 0 as C → ∞.






















Denote the eigenvalues of the fundamental equilibrium by λj(ε), j = 0,··· ,L + 2.
By standard arguments it is shown that one eigenvalue, say λ0(ε), tends to inﬁnity
as 1/ε as ε → 0, while the other eigenvalues tend to the eigenvalues of the system
without rational agents. The solutions that diverge from x = 0 at the rate λt
0 are local
rational bubbles. The following theorem shows that it is possible to exclude these by
a judicious choice of the initial prediction x0
0 of the rational type.
THEOREM 3.1. Let λ1 be eigenvalue with the largest absolute value m1 = |λ1| at
the fundamental steady state of system (8) without rational agents. There is a small
neighborhood U of the fundamental equilibrium x = 0, and a cost level C0 > 0,
such that for all initial conditions x−`, ` = 1,··· ,L in U, for any δ > 0, and for
any C > C0, the following holds.
There is an initial prediction x0
1 = ψe(x0
−1,··· ,x0
−L) of the rational type, and an
implied initial market clearing price x0
0 = ψ(x0
−1,··· ,x0









15is well deﬁned, Ck, and restricted to an invariant hypersurface of (18). For all x0
t ∈ U







Moreover, as C → ∞, the linearization of the evolution (20) at x = 0 tends to the
linearization of the system (8) without rational agents.
Theorem 3.1 implies that rational agents can choose their initial forecast x0
1 in such
a way that the dynamics in (18) is restricted to an invariant manifold, so that rapidly
exploding rational bubbles are avoided. The theorem thus implies that in a hetero-
geneous agents setting, a “transversality condition” avoiding bubble solutions can be
imposed. If the costs for perfect foresight are high, so that the fraction of rational
agents is small, the dynamics on the invariant manifold is similar to the dynamics
without rational agents in (8). In particular, the local stability of the fundamental
steady state is described by a characteristic equation QC which tends to the character-
istic equation Q in the case without rational agents, when C → ∞. This implies that,
when the information gathering costs for perfect foresight are high, the ﬁrst bifurca-
tion to local instability in the presence of a small fraction of rational agents is close
to the ﬁrst bifurcation in the case without rational agents. But more can be said. The
invariant manifold persists after the ﬁrst bifurcation so that additional steady states
and/or cycles created immediately after a ﬁrst bifurcation also persist. This implies,
for example, that if the system without rational agents exhibits a generic saddle-node,
a period doubling or a Hopf bifurcation, the system with a sufﬁciently small fraction
of rational traders exhibits the same bifurcation at almost the same critical value.
3.2 Can rational agents employ more hedging instruments to stabilize markets?
In Section 2 we have seen that in a heterogeneous world with only boundedly rational
agents, destabilization comes earlier if more Arrow securities are added to the system.
We are now ready to explore what happens in the presence of rational agents.
163.2.1 A small fraction of rational traders cannot prevent destabilization. Let
¯ xn(C) be a steady state of the system (18) with a (small) fraction of rational agents,






exists. Let β = β∞
n be the bifurcation value at which the steady state ¯ x∞
n of the
system (8) without rational agents and with n Arrow securities ﬁrst loses stability.
According to our earlier Theorem 2.1, in a world with only boundedly rational traders
β∞
n+1 < β∞
n , that is, the primary bifurcation to instability occurs earlier when there are
more Arrow securities. The following result extends this result to the case with a small
fraction of rational agents:
THEOREM 3.2. Assume that the stability losing bifurcation β∞
n in the case without
rational agents and n Arrow securities is of co-dimension one (e.g. a generic Hopf,
period doubling or saddle-node bifurcation). There is a constant C0 such that for C >
C0, the system (18) in the presence of a rational type and with n Arrow securities ﬁrst
loses stability at β = βn(C), and
βn+1(C) < βn(C),
for n = 1,··· ,S − 2.
The heuristic content of this result is that when perfect foresight is costly, rational
traders cannot prevent destabilization. When the costs for perfect rationality are high,
so that the fraction of rational agents remains small, the ﬁrst bifurcation still comes
earlier when there are more Arrow securities.
3.2.2 Rational traders may eventually stabilize markets. Theorem 3.2 implies
that, aslongasthefractionofrationalagentsremainssmall, themarketmaydestabilize
when the number of Arrow securities increases. But what happens if the number
of Arrow securities keeps increasing and the market approaches completeness? Will
17perfectly rational agents be able to use a sufﬁciently large set of Arrow securities to
hedge out their risk, outperform the other strategies, grow in number and eventually
stabilize the market? Stated differently, will the beneﬁts of an almost complete market
for perfectly rational traders outweigh the costs of “thinking hard”?
The answer to this question depends on the composition of the population of hetero-
geneous, boundedly rational agents. There are two alternatives. The ﬁrst occurs if
all boundedly rational types are biased at the fundamental steady state. As the risk
measure σ2
n decreases towards zero, rational agents will drive out all biased types, sta-
bilizing the market and forcing prices to converge to fundamental value. This is the
content of theorem 3.3 below.
We obtain the second alternative, if there are boundedly rational types who at the
fundamental steady state predict that the price remains at steady state. Rational traders
are unable to drive out these unbiased boundedly rational types and the market may
remain unstable, even when approaching market completeness. An example of this
phenomenon is given in section 4.
THEOREM 3.3. Assume that all boundedly rational types are biased in the funda-
mental steady state xt = 0, that is, assume that
f
0
ht(0,··· ,0) 6= 0, h = 1,··· ,H.
Then for every C > 0 and every 0 ≤ n < S − 1, there is a ¯ σ2 > 0 such that if the risk
measure satisﬁes 0 < σ2
n < ¯ σ2, then the system (18) with a fraction of rational agents
has a locally attracting stable steady state.
The proof of this result is given in A.5. The idea of the proof is simple: the prediction
errors of the boundedly rational traders lead to huge positions, and consequently huge
losses, if the risk measure σ2
n is very small. If the losses are much bigger than the
costs C of acquiring a perfect forecast, the rational type dominates the market and
(locally) stabilizes the fundamental price.
183.3 Welfare. So far we have focussed on its potential (de)stabilizing effect, but
now consider how the introduction of additional hedging instruments affects welfare.





Notice the timing here: welfare is averaged over the fractions nh,t−1 of type h whose
realized utility is uht. Using (11) and uR
t = 1
2hBt−1,V −1Bt−1i, with the realized return
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The ﬁrst term represents (minus) the squared forecasting errors averaged over the pop-
ulation of non-rational agents. Substituting Rx0
t−1 =
PH
h=0 nh,t−1fh,t−1 into the third
term, and merging it with the ﬁrst term into a “variance”, average welfare simpliﬁes to
Wt = 1







ht is the “variance” of the forecasting errors ht = x0
t − fh,t−1 of non-rational
types, with “mean” µht = x0
t −
PH
h=0 nh,t−1fh,t−1. The ﬁrst term reﬂects the “risk
premium” for the population of traders to hold the risky assets, and the second term
the costs of rational agents. If rational agents drive out all non-rational types and force
prices to their fundamental benchmark (i.e. xt ≡ 0), welfare becomes 1
2(aζ0)2σ2 −C,
the risk premium net of the costs of rationality. The third term in (23) reﬂects a
(temporary) “irrationality bias” in population averaged welfare, which e.g. is posi-
tive (negative) if a positive deviation from fundamental price grows faster (slower)
than a rational bubble (i.e. if x0
t − Rx0
t−1 > 0 (< 0)). If prices ﬂuctuate around its
fundamental value, the time average of this “irrationality bias” will be close to 0. The
last term, −σ2
ht/(2aσ2
n), captures the effect of the spread of the forecasting errors of
non-rational agents. Since the risk measure σ2
n decreases with the number of Arrow
19securities, non-zero forecasting errors of non-rational types will blow up when the
number of hedging instruments increases. In fact, when non-rational agents and their
forecasting errors persist, average welfare may blow up to minus inﬁnity as the market
approaches completeness (see Figure 1d). On the other hand, if rational agents can
use the hedging instruments to drive out non-rational agents and stabilize the market,
welfare losses will be limited to the costs of “thinking hard”.
4 Example
This subsection presents a simple example illustrating that adding Arrow securities
destabilizes the system and may lead to cycles and even chaos, that average welfare
decreases, and that rational agents can not drive out unbiased traders when the market
approaches completeness. There are three types of traders with forecasting rules (in
deviations from the fundamental benchmark):
f0t = x
0
t+1, f1t = 1, f2t = xt−1 + g(xt−1 − xt−2). (24)
Rational traders (type 0) have perfect foresight. Type 1 agents use information about
economic fundamentals and predict that the price of the risky asset will be equal to its
fundamental value, but they make an (small) error (normalized to 1). Type 2 are trend
followers who do not use fundamental information, but extrapolate the latest observed
price change by an extrapolation factor g. Note that this is an unbiased forecasting rule
at the fundamental steady state. Taking aσ2 = 1, the ﬁtnesses of the strategies read as
u0t = −C, u1t = −(xt−1 − 1)
2, u2t = −(xt−1 − (1 + g)xt−3 + xt−4)
2.
(25)
4.1 Dynamics without rational traders. First consider the case that C = ∞, so






































































Figure 1: Bifurcation diagrams and average welfare in the 2-type example with biased traders versus
trend extrapolators (R = 1.1, g = 1.101). Panel 1(a): bifurcations of steady states. The curve shown is
the locus of the steady state equilibria x∗. Two saddle node (SN) bifurcations and one Hopf bifurcation
occur, and x∗ → 0, the true fundamental, as β → ∞. Panel 1(b): largest Lyapunov exponent. As
the intensity of choice β increases the system loses stability in a Hopf bifurcation, after which cycles
and chaos (with positive largest Lyapunov exponent) arises. Panel 1(c): effective intensity of choice
βn = β/(aσ2
n) as a function of the number n of Arrow securities. Panel 1(d): welfare averaged over
the population and over time, as a function of the effective intensity of choice. Dotted curves correspond
to unstable steady states. The lower branch of the solid curve corresponds to the “biased” steady state
(the upper branch in panel 1(a)), while the upper branch (between SN1 and Hopf) corresponds to the
stable near fundamental steady state (the lower branch in Panel 1(a)) and, after the Hopf bifurcation,
to the quasi-periodic or chaotic attractor.
21The following bifurcation scenario occurs7. For β = 0, the steady state x∗ = 1/(2R−
1) = 1/(1+2r) ≈ 1(recallthatr = R−1). Thissteadystateiscloseto1, thepredicted
steady state of type 1. As β increases, the steady state x∗(β) moves along the upper
part of the curve in Figure 1a, and this steady state is stable. For β = βSN1 ≈ 5.5 two
additional steady states are created in a saddle-node bifurcation, one stable (the lower
one) and one unstable (the middle one)8. These two steady states are closer to the
fundamental value x ≡ 0. As β increases, the steady state closest to the fundamental
value loses stability through a Hopf bifurcation at βHopf ≈ 7.0. At βSN2 ≈ 13.6
a second saddle-node bifurcation occurs, and the two upper steady states disappear.
For βHopf < β < βSN2 a stable steady states co-exists with an attractor around the
fundamental steady state. Figure 1c shows a Lyapunov exponent plot, illustrating
the dynamical behavior after the Hopf bifurcation. After the Hopf bifurcation quasi-
periodic behavior occurs with a Lyapunov exponent close to 0. For large values of
β the dynamics becomes chaotic, with positive Lyapunov exponent. Introduction of
additional Arrow securities has the same effect as increasing the parameter β. For
example, with S = 40 states of the world with probabilities αs = 1/S and dividends
ys = s−1, ﬁxing β = 1 yields the following dynamics depending upon the number n
of Arrow securities (see Figure 1c): (i) unique stable steady state for n = 0 and n = 1;
(ii) co-existence of two stable steady states for 2 ≤ n ≤ 9; (iii) co-existence of stable
steady state and (quasi-)periodic attractor for n = 10 and n = 11; (iv) (quasi-)periodic
attractor, for 12 ≤ n ≤ 32, and (v) chaotic behavior, for 33 ≤ n < S = 39.
Figure 1(d) plots average welfare, averaged over the population and over time, as a
function of the effective intensity of choice β/σ2
n, in the case without rational traders.
Welfare decreases when the number of Arrow securities increases. Only between the
ﬁrst saddle-node bifurcation SN1 and the Hopf bifurcation, when a stable near funda-
mental steady state exists, welfare increases, but it decreases again after the Hopf bi-
7See for mathematical treatments of bifurcation theory e.g. Kuznetsov (1995).
8Hens and Pilgrim (2003) show that new ﬁnancial securities may change the number of equilibria in a perfect
foresight model.
22furcation (averaged over the quasi-periodic or chaotic attractor). In particular, welfare
explodes (to minus inﬁnity) as the market approaches completeness. In this ecology of
traders, rational agents can not stabilize welfare, because they can not drive out trend
following strategies.
4.2 Rational traders can not always eventually stabilize. We now add rational
traders to the system with biased traders and trend extrapolators, that is, we take 0 ≤
C < ∞. Our objective is to show that, in contrast to Theorem 3.3, in the presence of
(unbiased) trend extrapolators rational traders cannot stabilize the fundamental equi-
librium, even locally. System (19) has a steady state equilibrium x∗ ∈ R if x = x∗
satisﬁes the equation








+ x = 0.
Note that this steady state equation is independent of the trend extrapolation factor g.
From this equation, the value η can be solved as a function of x, yielding
η = η∗(x) =
1
(x − 1)2 log
1 − Rx
(1 + ε)(R − 1)x
.
Note that η → ∞ as x → 0; that is, for large values of η, there is a single equilibrium
that tends to the fundamental equilibrium (see Figure 1(a)). We are interested in the
stability of this near-fundamental steady state when the market approaches complete-
ness, that is, when η = β/σ2
n → ∞. The next result, which is proved by linearization
around the near-fundamental steady state, gives conditions when rational agents can
stabilize the market when the number of Arrow securities is large:
THEOREM 4.1. Let x∗ be the near-steady state equilibrium of (19) with speciﬁca-
tions (24) and (25). Let η = β/σ2
n. If η is sufﬁciently large and
1. if 0 < g < R, then x∗ is locally stable;
2. if g > 2R − 1, then x∗ is locally unstable;
233. if R < g < 2R − 1, and C is sufﬁciently small (close to 0), then x∗ is locally
stable;
The stability in the limiting case of a complete market depends on the magnitude of
the trend extrapolation factor g. When the trend parameter is small (0 < g < R) the
market will always be stable. For intermediate parameter values (R < g < 2R−1), if
the costs for rationality are small and the number of Arrow securities is large, rational
agents can still stabilize the market. However, when the trend extrapolation factor is
large (g > 2R − 1 = 1+ 2r ≈ 1), the price dynamics will remain unstable even if the
market approaches completeness9.
5 Concluding Remarks
In the last decade we have seen an explosive growth of risk hedging instruments in ﬁ-
nancialmarkets. Thereisalsoempiricalevidencethatinvestmentdecisionsare(partly)
driven by relative performance. It has been argued recently, e.g., by Rajan (2005), that
under such conditions markets may be exposed to more ﬁnancial-sector turmoil than
in the past. We have formalized this idea in a stylized asset pricing model with het-
erogeneous beliefs. Hedging instruments are represented by Arrow securities, which
may be viewed as proxies for more complicated ﬁnancial instruments. When agents
adapt their behavior based upon reinforcement learning, a general mechanism for po-
tential instability applies. Adding Arrow securities to the market may destabilize price
dynamics, and thus increase volatility, and at the same time decrease average welfare.
We have also investigated whether the beneﬁts of “thinking hard” can outweigh its
costs: can fully rational traders use the extra hedging instruments to drive out non-
rational agents, stabilize the market and limit welfare losses? As long as their fraction
9Hommes et al. (2005) estimated trend extrapolation factors in learning to forecast experiments with human
subjectsinthesameassetpricingsetting(withoutArrowsecurities). Manyindividualsusedtrendfollowingforecasting
rules, with estimated trend parameters ranging from 0.4 ≤ g ≤ 1.3, covering all three cases of Theorem 4.1.
24is small, e.g. due to high information gathering costs, rational traders can not prevent
destabilizationwhenmoreArrowsecuritiesareintroduced. However, undersomecon-
ditions rational agents can stabilize prices. For example, when all non-rational trader
types are biased (i.e. make a small error) at the fundamental steady state, then ratio-
nal agents eventually stabilize prices and limit welfare losses to the costs of “thinking
hard” as the market approaches completeness. As more and more hedging instruments
are introduced, rational agents take bigger positions in their hedging portfolio and their
beneﬁts outweigh the information gathering costs for rationality. On the other hand, if
one of the non-rational strategies uses an unbiased strategy such as a simple trend ex-
trapolating forecast rule, and trend extrapolation is sufﬁciently strong, rational agents
are unable to stabilize prices even when the market approaches completeness and there
are no costs for rationality.
Our model is very stylized and much too simple to capture all aspects of ﬁnancial com-
plexity in real markets. But it is tempting to compare our main results to some stylized
features of speculative trading, e.g. due to large hedge funds, in real markets. For ex-
ample, Prabhu (2001) describes the LTCM “convergence trade” investment strategy to
take a leveraged position to proﬁt from an expected narrowing of the spread between
the yields of “on the run” and “off the run” bonds as follows:
“For example, in August 1993, before Long-Term entered the market, 30-year bonds
yielded 7.24%, while 29 1/2 year bonds yielded 7.36%. This 12 basis point spread
would not allow it to earn the type of returns that its investors expected, so the traders
at LTCM needed to leverage their trade in order to magnify this return. On this par-
ticular trade, such magniﬁcation was very easy. LTCM received cash when it shorted
the on-the-run bond, and it could then use that cash to buy the off-the- run. This meant
that it needed to put up very little cash in order to ﬁnance this pair of transactions,
and could easily leverage the tiny arbitrage proﬁt into large gains. This type of trade
was reportedly often leveraged thirty to forty times in order to generate high returns
on equity.”
25The hedging portfolio computed in (16) and (17) has similar features. It contains
both long and short positions, similar to many actual hedge fund strategies like the
130/30 type positions discussed in Lo and Patel (2007) on the new ”Long-Only”.
When traders think that the stock is underpriced, they approximate it with the Ar-
row securities available as well as they can, go short in the approximate portfolio, and
use the money to buy the stock. As the stock and its approximation have almost the
same dividend structure, the traders have almost no dividend risk: the dividends they
have to pay on the Arrow security portfolio, they pay out of the dividend revenues
from the stock. However, they bet on making a gain out of the price movement. In
toto, they ”put very little cash in order to ﬁnance this pair of transactions”.
How general are these results? Clearly, they will not always hold. We have derived
them in a simple asset pricing model with heterogeneous beliefs, but the results can be
generalized, for example, to a general equilibrium overlapping generations setting10.
One could also think of a more general model, for example by including stabilizing
forces such as an increase of the time horizons of agents (e.g Levine and Zame, 2002)
or a decrease of the rates at which agents discount the future (e.g. Blume and Easley,
2006). What would happen in a more general model taking these stabilizing forces
into account as well as the potentially destabilizing effect of learning? Which force
will “win”? The search for an answer in more elaborate models will be an exciting
area for future research.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of lemma 1. We ﬁrst state and prove a more general matrix lemma:
LEMMA 2. LetQn beasymmetric(n,n)-matrixandQn+1 asymmetric(n+1,n+1)-





, where r is an n-vector and s a scalar, and let ˜ w =





















The proof of the ﬁrst part of this lemma can be established by a variation on the use
of the formula for the inverse of a partitioned matrix which uses the notion of Schur
complement of a submatrix of a matrix (Skogestad and Postlethwaite (1996, p. 499).
The second part can be established using Schur’s formula for the determinant of a
partitioned matrix (Skogestad and Postlethwaite (1996, p. 500)).
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2.1. The proof follows immediately from inequality (12)
or equivalently, the inequalities (14). The ﬁtness given by average risk-adjusted proﬁts
(11) is proportional to (V −1
n )00 or, equivalently, inversely proportional to σ2
n. Let β∗
0
be the ﬁrst bifurcation value when there are no Arrow securities. Then the system with



















30From (14) we infer that β∗
0 > β∗
1 > ··· > β∗
S−2. Consequently, with more Arrow
securities the primary bifurcation comes earlier.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3.1 Choose C0 so large that for C > C0 and ε = e−βC <
e−βC0 the “rational” eigenvalue λ0 satisﬁes λ0(ε) > |λ1(ε)|k+δ. Then it follows from
a straightforward application of the theorem on pseudo-hyperbolic maps of Hirsch,
Pugh and Shub (1977) that all orbits of (19) diverging from the origin at a speed at
most (m1+δ)t form a k-times continuously differentiable hypersurface in phase space,
tangent to the corresponding eigenspace. The map ψ parameterizes this surface.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 3.2 We are interested in bifurcations of system (18), as the
parameter β is varied, for large values of C. The most direct approach is to introduce
a new parameter ε = e−βC, and to study the resulting equation for small values of ε.
However, as ε not only depends on C, but also on the bifurcation parameter β, this
leads to certain technical problems.
We therefore take an idea from singularity theory and study an unfolding of equa-


















The original system (18) is the subfamily of the new system that is obtained by re-
stricting to the curve γC(β) = (β, e−βC) in parameter space.
The assumption that β∞
n is the destabilizing bifurcation value of β, and that the bifur-
cation is a codimension one bifurcation of (8), implies that there is a curve of bifurca-




n , there are constants ε0 > 0 and bn > 0 such that
0 < b0 < ··· < bn−1 < βn+1(ε) < bn < βn(ε) < ··· .
for all 0 ≤ ε ≤ ε0. Let C0 > 0 such that 0 < e−βC < ε0 if C > C0 and β > b0. As
the ﬁrst destabilizing bifurcation value β = βC
n+1 of (18) in the presence of n Arrow
31securities is ﬁrst coordinate of the intersection point of γC with hn, it follows that
βC
n+1 < bn < βC
n , as claimed.







Introducing η = β/σ2








































where δ = ε−1 PH
h=1 e−η(f0
h)2 and where O(2) collects the terms of higher than ﬁrst
order in the xt.
It follows from the implicit function theorem that there is a unique steady state x∗(δ),
depending smoothly on δ ∈ [0,δ0], such that x∗(0) = 0. The characteristic polynomial
of (26) has for δ = 0 one root λ = R and L+2 roots 0. If necessary by decreasing δ0 >
0, we have that for all 0 ≤ δ ≤ δ0, one characteristic root is outside the unit circle,
while the others are within.
As all f0
h at x = 0 are bounded away from zero, the condition δ < δ0 can be satisﬁed
if η is sufﬁciently large, or, equivalently, σ2
n sufﬁciently small.
As before, by choosing the initial price appropriately, the dynamics are restricted to
the center-stable manifold of the steady state, which here is a purely stable manifold.
But on the stable manifold, the steady state is locally asymptotically stable.
32